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Abstract: Terrorism is an ever-present threat that is becoming more prevalent in today’s society.
The railway has always been a favourable target for terrorists due to the high volume of people
that utilise it, as well as the vital services it provides to the nation. The railway is expanding
and this will likely result in it becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack, unless new mitigation
solutions are devised. In this paper risk assessment analyses by a software package conducted on
different sections of the railway station provided insight into the present vulnerabilities. Mitigation
solutions were devised to abolish these weaknesses in the system, to avoid terrorist exploitation.
They were then evaluated to establish a workable solution: a modified version of the Thales Smart
Corridor. This workable solution should be implemented across the nation to ensure passenger and
rail infrastructure protection.
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1. Introduction
September 11th is a date forever ingrained in the memories of the world as one of the worst
aterrorist attacks in modern history. With 2996 dead in a day, [1], the incident highlighted the global
requirement to re-evaluate how safety is ensured. Global terrorism is becoming increasingly common,
with approximately 700 incidents in 1970 rising to near 16,800 incidents in 2014 alone [2]. Stories of
conflict and destruction fill our newspapers, the latest of which in Europe, occurred on 22 March 2017
on Westminster Bridge in London [3]. Attacks of terror take many forms. Although their purposes are
often unknown, they incite fear and are typically used to demonstrate rebellion against an aspect of
a civilisation they disagree with. A recurrent target of these attacks is popular infrastructure, with
establishments such as airports and train stations being prime targets, due to the heavy foot traffic,
the ‘open and accessible designs’ of railway stations [4], and vital services they provide to society.
Airports have rigorous security checks and extensive safety protocols. However, railway stations do
not have such procedures in place, although a study conducted by Professor Arnold Barnett, the George
Eastman Professor of Management Science and a Professor of Statistics at the MIT Sloan School of
Management [5], found the risk per mile of rail travel is ten times greater than if you were to travel by
air [6]. Yet the railway stations rely on CCTV, public vigilance, and the occasional security guard to
maintain the peace. Despite the acknowledgement from Adrian Dwyer, the British Transport Police’s
counter terrorism risk advisor, that ‘ensuring anything like 100% protection against terrorist attack
is not a viable option’ [7], the current means of terrorism mitigation are insufficient in providing
consistently assured public safety. The 2004 attack on the Metro in Madrid demonstrated just how
vulnerable the railway currently is, with 191 dead and 1841 wounded [8]. Terrorism is on the rise and
the railways are expanding. Due to the developments in high speed rail technology [9–11], baggage
handling systems [12–14], and urban freight by rail [15–17], the railway network is set to expand [18].
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This expansion will make rail travel a greater target for terrorist activities. Alternate, effective terrorist
threat mitigation strategies must be devised to ensure the sustained protection of the public and
railway infrastructure.
2. Objective, Methodology, and Scope
The objective of this study is to identify the prevalent risks/threats to railway, metro, and urban
passenger freight, and propose a workable solution to help mitigate these risks/threats and to most
effectively implement it.
This has been achieved through the following stepwise methodology:
1. Identify the potential risks and threats to people and infrastructure.
2. Establish where these risks and threats have the most devastating impact.
3. Provide mitigation strategies for these risks and threats.
4. Evaluate the mitigation strategies used to obtain a workable solution.
5. Determine how this workable solution is to be implemented.
A comprehensive data analysis, 1972–2011, is conducted in [19] to better understand the evolution
of terrorist attacks targeting rail and metro systems. The data analysis looked at geographical
distribution of terrorist attacks and drew conclusions about the most targeted elements and components
of the railway system (rail lines followed by trains and stations) [20,21]. It was found that the most
used tool for terrorist act is a bomb carried by a suicide bomber. When referring to the rail and metro
stations they concluded that the medium and small size stations are more vulnerable and easier to
attack. As for countermeasures and tools, the most common are visual cameras, though they are not
the most effective. It was concluded that the most effective tools to prevent terrorist attempts are the
security guards. Although every station is characterised by certain peculiarities [9,12,13,20,21] it was
concluded that a more innovative security approach with a better understanding of the rail operation
pattern behing can have a positive effect on every rail station vulnerability level and railway systems
as a whole.
According to [22], technical systems employed presently in metros cannot prevent bringing
explosive devices of a certain type into the metro. This is quite worrying and presents us with an
area of concern and certainly requires special attention. [23] organised 20 interviews with experts and
concluded that there are certain problems when tackling vulnerabilities in preparedness, which result
in an inability to ensure that trains are secure when acts of antagonistic violence occur. This outlines
another area of concern when it comes to terrorist attempts to cause severe damages to the railway
facilities and systems. In addition, [11], after having analysed the capabilities of technical security
systems applied to protect high-speed (HS) trains, concluded that there is no protection against terrorist
attacks using drones that carry bombs and explosives. To resolve this threat, suppression by radio
interference generated by a national security system is proposed to interfere, devalue, neutralise, and
remove the harmful device. But the efficiency of this suggestion depends on many factors, very first of
which is how reliable the national security system is.
For measures to observe and protect railway networks in urban areas in particular, [24] developed
a game theory model for scheduling professional teams patrolling an urban railway network. They
set up a non-cooperative simultaneous move game between a defender and an attacker and obtained
promising results for patrol scheduling of a real-world urban railway network. Although patrols are
crucial for defending and protecting the railways, setting up an efficient and most workable schedule
is a huge challenge. Because patrol schedules have a repetitive nature, terrorists can easily fool the
patrols, distract them, and do their malicious damage. Patrolling requires precision, a lot of resources,
and 24/7 human presence. Because we live in a digital era, it is believed that digitalisation and new
technology for surveillance, object detection, and recognition will provide new and more efficient
means for us to observe and protect the railways.
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In [25], is argued that there are not any published documents on a simplified approach to the
risk assessment and protection of existing subway stations, which is rather worrying if we consider
the fact that protecting the railways is supposed to be highly confidential. Nevertheless, a Threat
and Vulnerability Risk Assessment (TVRA) applied to a generic subway station was developed and
published to advise on mitigation strategies expected to mitigate the risk of terrorist attempts
and malicious acts intended to damage existing subway stations. [26] developed a risk-based
decision-making framework on a basis of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Their work was
inspired by [27] and proposed that the state of partial neutralization affects the decisions of the attacker
and yields different loss scenarios. The framework proposed need to be revisited and updated when
more information becomes available, though. Also a better use of existing knowledge and technology
for utility coherence, layered security systems, data fusion, and possibly implementation of wireless
sensors needs to be considered, ensured, and demonstrated for better response to malicious terrorist
attempts to be identified, captured, and prevented.
This paper explores the current nature of terrorism and its exploitation of public rail transport
systems by recognising the particular interest in the railways whilst examining existing railway
terrorism avoidance and prevention mechanisms, describing them as insufficient. It then proceeds to
identify the aims of the paper, which are to establish the potential risks to people and infrastructure when
considering terrorism on the railways, including where these risks would have the most devastating
impact, mitigation strategies, an evaluation to obtain a workable solution, and how the solution
should be implemented. Risk assessments are then conducted on each area of a station to thoroughly
investigate the risks and threats that specific regions would be vulnerable to, in order to then devise
appropriate mitigation solutions; this is done with the Risk Manager application software. The reason
for the selection of this software is then discussed. Risk assessments are conducted for the station
platforms, trains, tunnels/walkways, shops/restaurants, waiting rooms, and the atrium. The shops and
restaurants are identified as the locations with the greatest associated risk. The mitigation strategies
used in the risk assessments are then evaluated. Calculations to analyse the probability of a terrorist
attack occurring on the railway in the next five years are then conducted, with the resultant likelihood
of an attack being 91%. The paper subsequently investigates the impact a mitigation solution would
have on population flow and the cost benefit. Then it considers the proposed solution to search both
passengers and their luggage, potentially with a modified Thales Smart Corridor. The triggers that
cause terrorists to act are examined as potential means of prevention as they are the key risks that lead
to the eradication of all linked risks. It then analyses the elements of a workable solution, including
dispelling any concerns, describing the solution necessity and installation considerations. It then
describes how to further the paper’s research in the future.
3. Risk Assessment Software
In order to fully investigate the risks and threats that train stations are vulnerable to, it is necessary
to divide the station into sections and apply individual risk assessments to them. This is due to the
fact that vulnerability to attack varies across different parts of the station as a result of the nature of
the infrastructure in specific locations. A number of risk assessment methodologies exist that analyse
the particular risks associated with the railway. These include the RAMPART methodology, directed
at metro and light-rail services [28]. This methodology was modified and produced the SecuRail
toolbox. The SecuRail toolbox is unique in that it ‘incorporates counter measures as well as cost benefit
analysis’ [29]. However, the use of these applications was dismissed in favour of the generation of a
more comprehensive risk assessment, which would allow for the production of a universal mitigation
strategy that could be applied to various types of rail, not exclusively metro and light rail.
This study explores the use of the Risk Manager application software to examine different areas
of train stations and their infrastructure through individual location risk assessments. The purpose
of this software and how it is utilised serve to evaluate the effectiveness of mitigation solutions on a
rudimentary basis. The software allows for numerous risks to be input into a single database (Figure 1).
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Within individual edit windows, the properties of each risk are then defined more extensively, including
the risk identification, the pre-mitigation assessment, the risk mitigation and post-mitigation assessment
details (Figure 2). Outcomes of the assessments are displayed in charts depicting the probability
of attacks colour-coded according to increasing severity risk, should it occur, and displaying the
percentage likelihood that an attack of this severity would occur. The mitigation strategies that could
be adopted to lessen or eliminate the possibility of attack are then theoretically utilised, and the revised
assessment charts are generated to provide a visual comparison and percentage analysis of residual
risk severity after the mitigation solutions have been applied to assess their effectiveness.
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4. Risk Assessments
4.1. Platforms
Platforms are the areas in train stations where commuters wait to board their trains, and they
are usually equipped with seating, rubbish bins, and occasionally miniature cafes serving light
refreshments. Small offices may also be located on station platforms. Risks and mitigation solutions
for platforms are provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Risks and mitigation solutions for platforms.
Identified Risks Mitigation Solutions
Passenger pushed onto tracks Prevent access to the tracks
Device planted in rubbish bin 24/7 CCTV
Device planted under platform seating Security guards on the platform
Device planted in platform offices Search passenger bags
Device concealed in luggage Search passengers
Device concealed on attacker’s person Sniffer dogs on the platform
Knife obtained at a station shop Remove rubbish bins from the platform
Device planted in platform cafe Only permit staff access to platform offices
Attacker uses weapon on passengers Eliminate openings on the office front, speak through windows to passengers
Weapon concealed in attacker’s luggage Device detection system on the platform
Device detonated on attacker’s person Do not stock knives at station shop
Weapon concealed on attacker’s person Lock cafe at night
Device planted on tracks Man cafe at all times
Chart 1 depicts that the platforms have extreme, high, and low risks associated with them. The
chance of an extremely severe risk occurring is 53.8%, a highly severe risk occurring is 30.8%, and there
is a 15.4% chance that a low severity risk will occur.
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is 53.8%, a medium severity risk occurring is 30.8%, and there is still a 15.4% chance that a low severity
risk will occur.
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4.2. Trains
The trains themselves are at risk as millions of passengers use them, yet when in use their escape
routes are rendered practically non-existent. Trains completely confine passengers, potentially for
hours, until the next station. Risks and mitigation solutions for trains are given in Table 2.
T ble 2. Risks and mitigation solution for trains.
Identified Risks. Mitigation Solutions
Device planted in the toilets Device detection system in the toilets
Device planted in rubbish bin 24/7 CCTV on trains
Device planted under seating Security guards in the station
Device planted in luggage racks Search passenger bags pre boarding
Device concealed in luggage Search pass ngers pre boarding
Device concealed on attacker’s person Sniffer dogs in the station
Chemical weapon used Remove rubbish bins from train
Device planted in platform cafe Fire extinguishers on the train
Attacker uses weapon on passengers Smoke detectors across the train
Weapon concealed in attacker’s luggage Use flame-retardant material for upholstery
Device detonated on attacker’s person
Weapon concealed on attacker’s person
Attacker starts a fire with upholstery
Chart 3 depicts that the trains have extreme and medium risks associated with them. The chance
of an extremely severe risk occurring is 87.5%, and there is a 12.5% chance that a medium severity risk
will occur.
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4.3. Tunnels/Walkways
Tunnels and walkways provide the access routes from the ticket hall to the shops/restaurants or
the platforms. They are sometimes fully enclosed and occasionally just corridors. They experience
a considerable amount of foot traffic from passengers either boarding or alighting from trains, in
potentially restricted or confined spaces. Risks and mitigation solutions for tunnels/walkways are
presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Risks and mitigation solutions for tunnels/walkways.
Identified Risks Mitigation Solutions
Device planted in rubbish bin 24/7 CCTV
Chemical weapon used Security guards in the station
Attacker uses weapon on passengers Search passenger bags
Device concealed in luggage Search passengers
Device concealed on attacker’s person Sniffer dogs in the station
Weapon concealed in attacker’s luggage Remove rubbish bins from the platform
Weapon concealed on attacker’s person
Device detonated on attacker’s person
Chart 5 depicts that the tunnels/walkways have extreme, high, medium, and low risks associated
with them. The chance of an extremely severe risk occurring is 66.7%, a highly severe risk occurring is
16.7%, a medium severity risk is 8.3%, and a there is an 8.3% chance that a low severity risk will occur.Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 23 
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4.4. Shops/Restaurants
The station shops and restaurants, although usually connected to the atrium, have minimal
entrances and exits (usually just one). Due to their contents, shops and restaurants provide more
secluded and less conspicuous areas to place devices unnoticed. Risks and mitigation solutions for
shops/restaurants are given in Table 4.
Table 4. Risks and mitigation solutions for shops/restaurants.
Identified Risks Mitigation Solutions
Device planted in rubbish bin 24/7 CCTV
Device planted under seating Security guards in the station
Device planted in the shop/restaurant toilets Search passenger bags
Device concealed in luggage Search passengers
Device concealed on attacker’s person Sniffer dogs in the stati n
Chemical weapon used Remove rubbish bins with public access
Attacker starts a fire with upholstery Device detection system in the toilets
Attacker uses weapon on passengers Use flame-retardant material on restaurant seating
Weapon conce led in attacker’s luggage Smoke detectors in the shop/restaurant
Device detonated on attacker’s person Fire extinguishers in the shop/restaurant
Weapon concealed on attacker’s person Only permit staff access to cooking equipment
Utensils in restaurant utilised as weapons Provide plastic utensils instead of metal
Merchandise in shop utilised as a weapon Security tag all merchandise
Keep all merchandise that could be weaponised in a locked case
Chart 7 depicts that the shops/restaurants have extreme, high, medium, and low risks associated
with them. The chance of an extremely severe risk occurring is 63.6%, a highly severe risk occurring is
18.2%, a medium risk is 9.1%, and ther is a 9.1% chance that a low s verity risk will occur.
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4.5. Waiting Rooms
Waiting rooms across the station are where passengers await their trains. Similar to shops and
restaurants, although they are not significantly more accessible, they still provide cover for potentially
unscrupulous activity. Risks and mitigation solutions for waiting rooms are presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Risks and mitigation solutions for waiting rooms.
Identified Risks Mitigation Solutions
Device planted in rubbish bin 24/7 CCTV
Device planted under seating Security guards in the station
Device placed in waiting room toilets Search passenger bags
Device concealed in luggage Search passengers
Device concealed on attacker’s person Sniffer dogs in the station
Chemical weapon used Remove rubbish bins from waiting rooms
Attacker starts a fire with upholstery Device detection system in the toilets
Attacker uses weapon on passengers Use flame-retardant material on the seating
Weapon concealed in attacker’s luggage Smoke detectors in the waiting rooms
Device detonated on attacker’s person Fire extinguishers in the waiting rooms
Weapon concealed on attacker’s person
Chart 9 depicts that the waiting rooms have extreme, high, medium, and low risks associated
with them. The chance of an extremely severe risk occurring is 53.8%, a highly severe risk occurring is
15.4%, a medium risk is 23.1%, and there is a 7.7% chance that a low severity risk will occur.
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4.6. Atrium
The atrium is the open area in all medium-to-large stations occasionally referred to as the Concourse
or Ticket Hall. It displays train and platform information, contains the ticket offices and the toilets, as
well as many other features of the train station. It incorporates shops and restaurants, should the station
have any, as well as multiple enquiry offices. The atrium will often be at street level and consist of
multiple entrances and exits. Risk and mitigation solutio s for atriums re provid d in Table 6.
T ble 6. Risks and m tigation solutions for atriums.
Identified Risks Mitigation Solutions
Device placed in toilets Sniffer dogs in the station
Device planted in rubbish bin 24/7 CCTV
Device planted under seating Security guards in the station
Device planted in ticket office Se rch passenger bags
Device concealed in luggage Search passengers
Device conc aled on attacker’s p rson Secured access to the ticket office for staff only
Device concealed in luggage and placed in lost property Place photo booths in discreet corners of the station toavoid them being a target for exploitation
Device planted in bicycle racks Device detection system in the toilets
Attacker uses weapon on passengers Reinforced windows on the office front
Weapon concealed in attacker’s luggage Reinforced doors on the front of the station
Device detonated on attacker’s person Reinforced glass on the station windows/doors
Weapon concealed on attacker’s person
Chemical weapon used
Device placed in photo booth
Device thrown into the station
Explosive filled vehicle
Multiple attackers coordinate attack
Chart 11 depicts that the atriums have extreme, high, and medium risks associated with them.
The chance of an extremely severe risk occurring is 47.1%, a highly severe risk occurring is 29.4%, and
there is a 23.5% chance that a medium severity risk will occur.
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5. Mitigation Strategy Analysis
• Risk Assessment Severity Charts
It is evident from the post-mitigation assessment risk severity charts that the locations with the
highest risk are the shops and restaurants. This is due to the number of additional risks that are
associated with the shops and restaurants that are not encountered in all locations of the station. It will
also be noted that regardless of the implemented mitigation solutions, the post-mitigation assessment
risk severity charts still display significant levels of high severity threats. This is a result of the nature
of the risk because if any risk was to evade detection and occur, the effects of the risk would still
be devastating, as the mitigation was not done to minimise the impact of the risk, but to prevent it
from occurring altogether. This factor must be taken into consideration when the severity charts are
analysed. The mitigation strategies applied to the scenarios then evaluated were the strategies that
reduced the possibility of an attack occurring, such as security guards being positioned around the
station. The strategies that completely eradicated the risk were not applied in the assessment.
• Mitigation Strategies
The strategies proposed for mitigation purposes vary. Some of the suggested strategies are already
in use today across train stations, such as the 24/7 CCTV. The use of security guards and sniffer dogs is
also something that is widely acknowledged as being good practice, and stations recruit these services
fairly often, depending on the station capacity. The idea of searching bags and passengers is one that is
adopted in airports internationally as a way of ensuring security and safety for passengers taking to the
air, however it is not a practice that has been used in train stations before. The strategies that discuss
locking services at night and preventing public access to staff work spaces are, again, something done
universally, as is security tagging all merchandise in shops. The removal of station rubbish bins is
something that some stations such as the London Underground decide is necessary [30]. However,
most stations will decide that the inconvenience this generates is more significant. Preventing track
access is becoming increasingly common in underground and metro stations but is yet to be a standard
practice for aboveground trains, due to the potentially excessive cost of installing screens along the
platform, so passengers cannot reach the tracks. A number of the proposed mitigation strategies require
significant effort for little minimisation in risk. These include the ideas of placing the photo booths in
discreet corners of the stations, disallowing knives to be stocked in station shops, and providing plastic
utensils instead of metal. Whilst other ideas of reinforcing windows and doors across the stations are
occasionally already in use as a result of assault from members of the public and not terrorism, they
will still serve as a suitable preventative aid.
• Calculations
Based on [2,31], direct method of analysing probability of event occurrence:
P = (
∑
i=1, . . . , mWiPi) /
∑
i=1, . . . , mWi, (1)
where P: probability; m: narrowly defined samples; i: Wi cases in population of interest; Pi: probability
of event in defined sample.
Probability that there will be an attack on the railway in the next five years:
% increase since 2000: (1013/1651)*100 = 61.4%
P = (0.61*1651)*(1651/1826) + [(1826 − 1651)/1826]*0
P = 91% chance there will be an attack on the railway in the next five years.
6. Optimum Strategy
6.1. Aspects of Assessment
• Population Flow Impact
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The applied mechanism must be capable of providing maximum protection to commuters without
impacting the rate at which they progress through the train station. The chosen mitigation solution
must also be one that is easy to install, in terms of the minimal disruption it causes to commuters and
regular station operations. Additionally, it is crucial the chosen solution be ergonomic, permitting
immediate use by the public without extensive explanation or instruction on how to do so. Fast travel
with minimal delays is ideal for commuters. If not achieved, it may discourage the use of rail travel.
• Cost Benefit
The cost of the implemented mitigation solution must relatively equate to the value of the benefit
that it will provide. The US government has spent $300 billion on counter-terrorism mitigation solutions
since 2001 [32]. Although a terrorist mitigation solution is one that will save lives, which are arguably
priceless, there is the possibility that the lives will never actually be in direct danger, which would
render the mitigation solution itself potentially excessive. In order to calculate if a specific mitigation
solution is worth the money it costs to implement it, a number of variables must be taken into account.
The net benefit is the indication of whether the mitigation solution will be worth the cost. The variables
that determine the net benefit consist of the number and type of threat scenarios, the probability of an
attack with and without the mitigation solution in place, the loss or consequence of not having the
solution, the number of loss attributes, the cost of the solution, the percentage of risk reduction due to
the solution being implemented, and a number of relative probabilities regarding the relative threat,
given an attack, and the losses, given the occurrence of a particular threat, without an implemented
solution [32]. All of these must be considered when determining how cost-effective a solution will be.
6.2. Solution Proposal
The optimum mitigation strategy is a combination of two solutions: to search passengers and to
search their luggage. Searching passengers ensures the removal of any equipment that could cause
other passengers, staff, or station occupants harm. This process is also simple, easy, and cost-effective
as it means that other mitigation methods do not need to be strictly applied to the stations or the trains
because the attackers will be apprehended upon entry to the station. This will be discussed further.
This mitigation strategy will ensure that people feel safe and secure when travelling. It will require
new equipment to be installed at each station across the nation and will therefore demand a fairly
considerable initial cost. However, the equipment will eliminate the requisite for other mitigation
solutions and thereby the expense of implementing those other solutions. The installation of this
mitigation solution will also in essence pay for itself should an attack occur, for the cost of building
repair and potential compensation for loss of life or injury would be substantial. The repercussions of
an attack also cost the government and the railway companies significantly, for attacks generate fear,
which makes people reluctant to travel using that medium. This was evident when an attack on Thalys
resulted in a ‘20%–30% loss of ridership’ in the subsequent months after the attack [18]. The ergonomic
concept will be familiar to many passengers, due the similarity to airport security checks. A result
of this will be the ease and pace at which commuters understand and utilise the new mechanisms,
minimising disruptions to their journeys, in addition to eradicating further repercussive costs as a
result of delays.
A more specific recommendation for an optimum mitigation strategy is a modified version
of the Thales Smart Corridor. It should be used as an initial start point or base design, with the
existing configuration of desirable capabilities adapted to better suit the requirements of this scenario.
Modifications are required to be made before the Smart Corridor’s implementation in the nation’s train
stations as the Corridor is ‘approximately three to four metres long’, which would be an undesirable
extension to all entrances in every station [33]. A combination of multiple technologies, it provides an
extremely apt solution to the issues presented regarding a suitable mitigation solution. The existing
capabilities include CCTV to count people, detect abandoned objects, and identify suspicious behaviour
such as abrupt changes in direction. There is also an incorporated biometric control system that
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identifies passengers by means of facial recognition software. Finally, sensors that can detect explosives,
metal and dielectric objects that are concealed beneath clothing are fitted. The Corridor is completely
transparent yet manages to fully inspect the passengers as they move through the mechanism, whilst
the passengers only experience a ‘slight breeze’ [34], Sci-fi screening process proposed by Thales, 2008.
7. Supplementary Considerations
7.1. Risk Assessment Analysis
• Triggers
The risk assessment analysis did not consider the triggers that incentivise terrorist attacks. This is
due to the fact that whether it is an individual or a group as part of a larger organisation, research [2]
shows there are a multitude of reasons why people would decide to perform an act of terrorism. For
example, each political decision will have support and opposition. Radicals, however, may choose to
voice their dissent through an attack. Terrorists are not known for their rationality; anything can be a
trigger. It is therefore impractical to monitor or attempt to control or reduce apparent triggers.
• Linked Risks
The analysis did however list the ‘linked risks’: risks that occur as a result of each other. For
example, the risk of a device being planted in a rubbish bin around the station is dependent on the
risks of a terrorist either concealing a device on their person or in their luggage. Linked risks are useful
in establishing a prioritised list of risk mitigation. See Figure 3.
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Linked risks demon trate the requi ement to focus on a workable mitigation solution to eliminate
the key risks, so that dependant risks will be subsequently eradicated.
7.2. Workable So ution A alysis
• Criminal Treatment
A commuter concern with regards to being searched is being treated like a criminal without
providing an reason for such t atment. However, as the analysis has shown, being searched is the
most effective mitigation solution and therefore a necessary procedure to ensure that any criminals
amongst the populace are identified and removed, so that they are unable to cause harm to those
commuters, the majority, who are not criminals.
• Privacy Violation
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The level of detail necessary to produce an image suitable for security inspection has been a topic
of controversial debate for some time. Existing scanners are capable of generating images so intricate,
it is possible to identify the size of passengers’ breasts and genitals [33]. This is an issue that the Thales
Smart Corridor does not encounter as it does not create a silhouette of the passenger and uses passive
devices in compliance with all health, privacy, and safety regulations [34]. This means all passengers
can use the Smart Corridor, or a modified version that harnesses this characteristic, without fear of
explicit exposure and under-aged members of the populace can make use of the mechanism without
indecent images of minors being produced.
• Necessity
Despite the fact that acts of terrorism are increasing, they remain fairly rare. When considering
the number of unimpeded journeys made by passengers compared to the number disturbed by an act
of terrorism, the idea of mitigation methods seems pointless. However, with the predicted climb in
passengers and the expansion of the railway network, attacks targeting the railways could become
increasingly common [18]. This means that it will become even more vital to have reliable and effective
security measures in place to ensure passenger safety. Conducting passenger searches is a simple way
to maximise commuter security by preventing attacks, as opposed to working to reduce the aftereffects
of an attack and the damage to people and property. Unfortunately, due to the rise in attacks that have
occurred on British soil, the remainder of the world could become increasingly fearful of further attacks
and hence concerned about their safety should they visit or relocate to the UK. This could have a
detrimental effect on British trade and tourism, similar to how Thalys was affected when attacked [18].
Therefore, it is essential that appropriate mitigation solutions are implemented to provide global
assurance that the UK is safe.
• Racial Profiling
Another objection to being searched is the ‘random’, more extensive searches that occur in
airports and the tendency to select a person who fits a specific profile. It is feared that this apparent
prejudice could be transferred to railway searches if they are implemented. The public have voiced
concerns that racial profiling could become more common, with ‘specific parts of the population being
targeted’ [35]. However, it has been acknowledged that a significant number of attackers do not fit
typical racial profiles. This means that they would not be selected for more extensive searches and
could potentially avoid detection, whilst innocent civilians who happen to fit a typical profile could be
wrongly questioned. The ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid apparently ‘did not fit a racial profile’ [34] and
the attacker who boarded a train in Switzerland with ‘fire and a knife’ was revealed by police to be
‘a Swiss citizen, with a “typical Swiss name”’ [36]. Each of these attackers did not fit a typical racial
profile. The mitigation mechanism implemented must avoid racial prejudice and treat all passengers
with no discrimination and equal treatment.
• Search upon Entry
Due to attacks such as the 2016 metro and airport bombings in Brussels [36], where a suicide
bomber entered the airport terminal in Brussels and detonated his device ‘in the departure hall near the
check-in desks’, it has become clear that an effective mitigation solution is required to check all persons
upon entry to the station. Any civilian who can gain access to a train station then has the capacity
to detonate a device in the building and cause harm to the infrastructure and surrounding populace,
regardless of whether they have purchased a ticket or whether they intend to travel themselves. It is
therefore evidently necessary that the search mechanism in place must be positioned at each entrance
to the station to prevent this type of attack from occurring again.
• Installation Locations
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Common locations for terrorist exploitation are the more popular train stations in cities, as terrorists
capitalise on the population density within the stations to create the greatest impact and attract the
most media attention, to achieve their aim of causing the biggest commotion possible. Certain stations
in the UK experience an inordinate volume of foot traffic, with the most popular station Waterloo,
Greater London, encountering 99,201,604 people annually [37]. This makes Waterloo a prime target for
terrorist activity, so naturally there are security measures around the station, however, a passenger can
board a train at a more rural location with minimal security measures, such as Shippea Hill, which
had only 22 visitors in 2014–2015 [38] and travel into Waterloo, entering the station unimpeded. This
highlights the requirement for the mitigation mechanisms to be installed at every station across the
country, regardless of how popular they are, to ensure maximum success in mitigating the terrorist
threats. Recommended is Thales Smart Corridor, 2017 [39].
8. Conclusions
Terrorism is unfortunately becoming more familiar to the world in modern society, with terrorists
turning on their own countries in demonstrations of extremism. All the nations need to prepare, as
more frequent and increasingly substantial attacks are to come, and work collectively to protect their
industry and their people whilst ensuring the necessary capacity to do so. It is evident from this study
that acts of terrorism are becoming more common and the expansion of the railways is going to make
train and subway stations even greater targets. Fail-safe mitigation strategies are required to assure
the continued safety of railway infrastructure and the public. The extensive research and analysis
conducted in this study have demonstrated that the most effective mitigation strategy to adopt is to
implement a passenger searching mechanism such as a modified version of the Thales Smart Corridor,
to efficiently identify and eliminate any suspicious objects and individuals in order to maintain public
faith and dependence on the railways for years to come.
9. Further Research
The work done throughout this study is a foundation for a concept that could save lives and
money. However, it is limited. Should this work be taken further and considered for implementation,
additional research must be conducted.
• Software Package
One area that requires significant attention is the software package used to analyse the data
collected. Although useful for this report, the Risk Manager software is limited. This software relies
on the input of the user to determine the potential risks and in this instance the user simply listed all
risks that occurred to them; however, this means that risks faced by the railways could have been
overlooked. The nature of risks that are omitted will vary, although it is reasonable to assume that risks
of a particularly sinister description will not be envisaged and will consequently not be featured in the
analysis. Therefore, the analysis could provide incomplete data from which inaccurate conclusions are
drawn. Existing station risk assessments should be examined and those featured risks should all be
entered into the software for analysis.
Within the Risk Manager software, each risk is categorised by the likelihood of the event occurring
and the severity of the risk, should it occur. However, both characteristics are subjective, with both the
likelihood and severity of a risk being dependant on multiple external variables each. Therefore, due to
the basis of the risk analysis being subjective, the conclusions drawn from the data are circumstantial.
In order to rectify this, the risks need to be categorised in a more qualitative manner.
Furthermore, through this software, the analysis performed does not have an impact on the
likelihood of an event occurring. The mitigation strategies applied to the risks only result in a reduction
of the severity level of the risk, and the likelihood of the event remains the same. This effectively
renders the categorisation of risks through their likelihood of occurrence as meaningless. However,
the likelihood of a devastating risk occurring is significant when considering the potential impact
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the risk could have on peoples’ lives and public infrastructure. Hence, it is imperative any software
used demonstrates that when the mitigation solutions are applied to the risks, the consequent analysis
reflects an impact on this vital consideration.
• Additional Aspects
Station Flow analysis should be undertaken once the chosen mitigation solution has been
implemented. This is to obtain further and legitimate validation that this solution is the optimum,
works in real time, and does not have a significant negative impact on public usage of the station and
its facilities.
The understanding that the execution of mitigation solutions will result in the reduction or
elimination of risks encountered by the railways should be substantiated through deeper analysis of
the linked risks. A risk identified as being the cause of another risk should be scrutinised individually
and extensively to ensure that the application of the proposed mitigation solution will render the risk,
and therefore all linked or associated risks, non-existent.
Author Contributions: A.L. developed the initial draft of the paper. M.M. formulated the aims and the scope of
this work. M.M. was instrumental for editing, reviewing and introducing quality and continuous improvements.
All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Global Terrorism Database1. GTD Search Results. 2017. Available online: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2000&end_yearonly=2001&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=
&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&region=1&country=217&perpetrator=20029&dtp2=all&success=
yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max= (accessed on 11 May 2017).
2. Global Terrorism Database2. GTD Search Results. 2017. Available online: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2015&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=
&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&region=12&region=2&region=7&region=4&region=9&region=
10&region=1&region=3&region=6&region=5&region=11&region=8&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&dtp2=
all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max= (accessed on 11 May 2017).
3. BBC News1. London Attack: What We Know So Far—BBC News. 2017. Available online: http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/uk-39355108 (accessed on 12 May 2017).
4. Marrone, S.; Nardone, R.; Tedesco, A.; D’Amore, P.; Vittorini, V.; Setola, R.; De Cillis, F.; Mazzocca, N.
Vulnerability modeling and analysis for critical infrastructure protection applications. Int. J. Crit. Infrastruct.
Prot. 2013, 6, 217–227. [CrossRef]
5. MIT Sloan School of Management. MIT Sloan Faculty Expertise Guide: Faculty Bio: Arnold Barnett.
2017. Available online: http://mitsloan.mit.edu/expertiseguide/facultybio.html?w=41132 (accessed on 12
May 2017).
6. Parfitt, T. Train Passengers ‘FOUR TIMES More Likely to be Hit by Terror Attack than Fliers’. The Daily
Express. 2017. Available online: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/600042/train-Paris-Amsterdam-
France-terror-attack-plane-public-transport-Arnold-Barnett (accessed on 12 May 2017).
7. Railway Technology. Terrorism: The Ever Evolving Threat. 2010. Available online: http://www.railway-
technology.com/features/feature88006/ (accessed on 13 May 2017).
8. News.bbc.co.uk. BBC NEWS | In Depth. 2017. Available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/
guides/457000/457031/html/default.stm (accessed on 15 May 2017).
9. Abbott, D.; Marinov, M. An event based simulation model to evaluate the design of a rail interchange yard,
which provides service to high speed and conventional railways. Simul. Model. Pract. Theory 2015, 52, 15–39.
[CrossRef]
10. Dhir, S.; Marinov, M.; Worsley, D. Application of the analytic hierarchy process to identify the most suitable
manufacturer of rail vehicles for High Speed 2. Case Stud. Transp. Policy 2015, 3, 431–448. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2020, 12, 3408 20 of 21
11. Shvetsov, A.V.; Shvetsova, S.V. Protection of high-speed trains against bomb-carrying unmanned aerial
vehicles. J. Transp. Secur. 2017, 10, 115–126. [CrossRef]
12. Brice, D.; Marinov, M.; Rueger, B. A Newly Designed Baggage Transfer System Implemented Using
Event-Based Simulations. Urban Rail Transit 2015, 1, 194–214. [CrossRef]
13. Yeung, H.K.; Marinov, M. A systems design study introducing a collection point for baggage transfer services
at a railway station in the UK. Urban Rail Transit 2019, 5, 80–103. [CrossRef]
14. Toal, J.; Marinov, M. A check-in and bag drop service onboard light rail vehicles for passengers travelling to
the airport. Sustain. Rail Transp. 2019, 3, 1–82, (Lecture Notes in Mobility).
15. Dampier, A.; Marinov, M. A study of the feasibility and potential implementation of metro-based freight
transportation in newcastle upon tyne. Urban Rail Transit 2015, 1, 164–182. [CrossRef]
16. Kelly, J.; Marinov, M. Innovative interior designs for urban freight distribution using light rail systems. Urban
Rail Transit 2017, 3, 238–254. [CrossRef]
17. Potti, P.; Marinov, M.; Sweeney, E. A simulation study on the potential of moving urban freight by a cross-city
railway line. Sustainability 2019, 11, 6088. [CrossRef]
18. Leboeuf, M. High-speed rail: Opportunities and threats. Engineering 2016, 2, 402–408. [CrossRef]
19. De Cillis, F.; De Maggio, M.C.; Pragliola, C.; Setola, R. Analysis of criminal and terrorist related episodes in
railway infrastructure scenarios. Homel. Secur. Emerg. Manag. 2013, 10, 1–30. [CrossRef]
20. Marinov, M.; Sahin, I.; Ricci, S.; Vasic-Franklin, G. Railway operations, time-tabling and control. Res. Transp.
Econ. 2013, 41, 59–75. [CrossRef]
21. Potti, P.; Marinov, M. Evaluation of Actual Timetables and Utilization Levels of West Midlands Metro Using
Event-Based Simulations. Urban Rail Transit 2020, 6, 28–41. [CrossRef]
22. Shvetsov, A.V.; Shvetsova, S.V. Research of a problem of terrorist attacks in the metro (subway, U-Bahn,
underground, MRT, rapid transit, metrorail). Eur. J. Secur. Res. 2017, 2, 131–145. [CrossRef]
23. Strandh, V. Exploring vulnerabilities in preparedness–rail bound traffic and terrorist attacks. J. Transp. Secur.
2017, 10, 45–62. [CrossRef]
24. Yolmeh, A.; Baykal-Gürsoy, M. Urban rail patrolling: A game theoretic approach. J. Transp. Secur. 2018, 11,
23–40. [CrossRef]
25. Avci, O.; Ozbulut, O. Threat and vulnerability risk assessment for existing subway stations: A simplified
approach. Case Stud. Transp. Policy 2018, 6, 663–673. [CrossRef]
26. Kaewunruen, S.; Alawad, H.; Cotruta, S. A decision framework for managing the risk of terrorist threats at
rail stations interconnected with airports. Safety 2018, 4, 36. [CrossRef]
27. Shafieezadeh, A.; Cha, E.J.; Ellingwood, B.R. A decision framework for managing risk to airports from
terrorist attack. Risk Anal. 2014, 35, 292–306. [CrossRef]
28. RAMPART Project. The Project-RAMPART Project. 2017. Available online: http://www.rampart-project.eu/
project (accessed on 14 May 2017).
29. Matsika, E.; O’Neill, C.; Battista, U.; Khosravi, M.; Laporte, A.; Munoz, E. Development of risk assessment
specifications for analysing terrorist attacks vulnerability on metro and light rail systems. Transp. Res.
Procedia 2016, 14, 1345–1354. [CrossRef]
30. Telegraph.co.uk. Bomb-Proof Bins to be Installed in London. 2017. Available online: http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/3327528/Bomb-proof-bins-to-be-installed-in-London.html (accessed
on 15 May 2017).
31. Alemi, F.; Sinkule, J. Security risk analysis. In Decision Analysis for Healthcare Managers; Chapter 9; Health
Administration Press: Ann Arbor, MI, USA, 2006; ISBN 13 978-1-56793-256-0.
32. Stewart, M. Risk-informed decision support for assessing the costs and benefits of counter-terrorism protective
measures for infrastructure. Int. J. Crit. Infrastruct. Prot. 2010, 3, 29–40. [CrossRef]
33. Boussadia, K. The evolution of airport screening technology. Biom. Technol. Today 2009, 17, 7–8. [CrossRef]
34. Thales, Sci-fi screening process. Biom. Technol. Today 2008, 16, 3–4. [CrossRef]
35. Paraskevas, A.; Arendell, B. A strategic framework for terrorism prevention and mitigation in tourism
destinations. Tour. Manag. 2007, 28, 1560–1573. [CrossRef]
36. Adams, S.; Milanian, K. Swiss Train Passengers Attacked with ‘Fire and Knife’ Sparking Terror Fears.
The Mirror. 2017. Available online: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/terror-swiss-train-
passengers-attacked-8624527 (accessed on 13 May 2017).
Sustainability 2020, 12, 3408 21 of 21
37. Deorden, L. Brussels Terror Attacks: At Least 30 Dead After Suicide Bombing and Explosions at Airport
and Metro Station. Idependent.co.uk. 2016. Available online: http://www.idependent.co.uk/news/world/
europe/several-wounded-after-two-loud-explosions-heard-at-brussels-airport-a6945381.html (accessed on
13 May 2017).
38. BBC News2. Revealed: Britain’s busiest and quietest stations—BBC News. 2017. Available online:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-35105105 (accessed on 13 May 2017).
39. Thales, Thales Smart Corridor. 2017. Available online: https://www.thalesgroup.com/fr/worldwide/securite/
press-release-54 (accessed on 12 May 2017).
© 2020 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
